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Abstract: This article tackles the question of transnational electoral participation resulting from 
emigration. Drawing on several strands of political science literature, the theoretical section 
explains why emigration is likely to be detrimental to migrants’ voting rates, which specific 
factors may affect these rates’ variation and, overall, when and how emigration impacts 
nationwide voter turnout. The theory is then tested using original datasets on emigration, legal 
provisions for external voting and external voting rates in 10 Central and East European 
postcommunist democracies (CEE-10). The results confirm that external voting rates are much 
lower than domestic ones and reveal that their cross-national and over-time variation can be, to 
a large extent, explained by legal provisions for external voting and diaspora size. As a corollary 
of the weak transnational participation, emigration accounts for approximately one tenth of the 
fall in voter turnout that has occurred in the CEE-10 since the early 1990s. 
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One late evening in spring 2007, ten thousand Romanian citizens assembled in an 
amphitheatre to listen to the speech of the country’s then president Traian Băsescu. An 
improvised stage was closely surrounded by the attendees who packed both the stands and the 
sandy central space. At stake was nothing less than Băsescu’s presidential mandate. As a result 
of the domestic political struggle, he was facing an impeachment referendum triggered by 
Romania’s Parliament.2 While he tried to galvanise the crowd, his supporters, refreshed by the 
spring breeze, were waving Romanian flags and holding banners expressing support for the 
president and his political party. Slogans in Romanian resonated in the surrounding streets… 
This could have been just a scene from one of the political rallies that were organized ahead of 
the 2007 referendum in large cities of Romania. Yet, this event was much less ordinary. The 
venue was neither Bucharest nor Cluj nor any other Romanian city. Băsescu met his fellow 
citizens in the bullring of the city of Castellon, Eastern Spain – more than 1500 kilometres away 
from the Romanian border and the remit of Băsescu’s presidency. This paradoxical location in 
a Spanish sanctuary of corrida perfectly illustrates the gradually growing importance of a 
Europe-wide and, partly, transatlantic demographic dynamic. Attracted by better economic 
prospects and facing loosening obstacles, millions of post-communist citizens – substantial 
parts of some countries’ electorates – moved abroad and, in particular, to the West.  
 
This articles tackles transnational electoral participation resulting from emigration. The 
research question is twofold. First, to what extent do transnational voting rates3 differ from 
domestic ones and what accounts for their variation? Second, if they differ, what is the impact 
on nationwide turnout? I empirically study ten post-communist Central and European 
democracies (CEE-10)4 – most of whom experienced both strong emigration and a dramatic 
fall in electoral participation since the advent of regular, democratic elections in 1989 or soon 
thereafter. My analyses focus on the first six democratic contests in each country and combine 
original data on emigration rates, electoral legislation and external voting rates.  
                                                 
2 The Romanian Parliament, controlled by a new majority after a series of political party splits, accused Traian 
Băsescu of unconstitutional behaviour (such as ‘abuse of power’ and ‘infringement of the powers of the state 
institutions’) and suspended him from office by 322 votes against 108 (and 10 abstentions) on 19th April 2007. In 
conformity with the Romanian Constitution, this clearly politically motivated move triggered an impeachment 
referendum in which, however, 75 % of voters supported Băsescu and refused the impeachment (cf. Gherghina 
and Miscoiu 2013: 674).    
3 In this article, I interchangeably employ the terms ‘external voting’ and ‘transnational electoral participation’ 
when referring to voting from abroad. 
4  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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With respect to the first research question, I confirm that transnational voting rates are 
expectedly much lower than the domestic ones. I break new ground by showing that legal 
provisions for external voting, of which registration procedures, and diaspora size can, to a large 
extent, explain variation in transnational voting rates. As for the second research question, I 
show that emigration contributes to the post-communist decline in voter turnout. According to 
my estimates, it accounts for approximately one tenth of the phenomenon. These findings 
demonstrate that international migration, the magnitude of which has been dramatically rising 
in the post-Cold War era (cf. Dumont and Lemaître 2005), is an increasingly salient factor for 
understanding voter turnout variation over time and across countries.   
 
I proceed as follows. I first formulate a number of general hypotheses on the relationship 
between emigration and voting based upon the existing literature on external voting and, in 
particular, on residential mobility. I expose why emigration should depress migrant’s voting 
rates, which specific factors may affect these rates’ variation and, overall, when and how 
emigration impacts nationwide voter turnout. To test these new theoretical claims, I 
subsequently focus more specifically on the CEE-10. In the second section, I present the data I 
use throughout the rest of the article. In the third section, I assess the extent and timing of post-
communist emigration. This allows me to estimate the number of post-communist citizens 
eligible to vote staying abroad during the period under study. In the fourth section, I describe 
the evolution of the provisions for external voting, which I expect, together with diaspora size, 
to account for cross-national variation in emigrants’ voting rates. Finally, in the fifth section, I 
test the validity of my hypotheses through a regression analysis of external voting rates and I 
estimate the contribution of emigration to the post-communist voter turnout decline.   
1. Theoretical Considerations: Emigration and Voting 
 In this section, I theoretically explain why emigrants’ can be expected to vote less than 
their fellow countrymen back home and which factors may impact on the magnitude of the 
difference. I also discuss the likely implications for nationwide turnout.  
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Emigration transforms voting in one’s motherland from a national political activity into 
a transnational one.5 As emigrants’ electoral participation extends across borders, it questions 
the classic linkage between citizenship and territorially-defined polity (Bauböck 2003). An 
important question for a student of political behaviour is whether and how the said 
transformation may affect the accomplishment of the voting act itself. Interestingly, this 
question has so far rarely been addressed in scientific literature. As several authors noted 
(Bauböck 2003, 708; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 764; Lafleur and Chelius 2011, 100), the 
existing works have mostly focused either on immigrants’ political engagement in the receiving 
country or on the impact of residential mobility (i.e. migration within a single polity). At the 
same time, the logic of residential mobility is, to some degree, similar to that of emigration. As 
a result, in developing my theory, I draw on the literature on residential mobility as well as the 
literature on external voting and the more general literature on who votes and why. 
 
The impact of residential mobility on electoral participation has been notably studied in 
the United States, which has one of the highest moving rates in the developed world. All the 
existing studies on the United States concur that moving reduces one’s propensity to vote 
(Verba and Nie 1972, 145; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 50-54; Squire, Wolfinger and Glass 
1987; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 157; Highton 2000; Franklin 2005). Several distinct but 
related causal mechanisms explain this negative effect on propensity to vote. Using the classic 
cost-benefit conceptualisation of the voting act (Downs 1957), these mechanisms 
simultaneously increase the costs and reduce the benefits of the voting act.  
 
The primary cause is voter registration, which is not automatic in most parts of the 
United States, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe and most other European countries.  In the 
United States it must be accomplished as a separate administrative procedure, often well in 
advance of election day. When moving, U.S. citizens typically have to reregister in their new 
place of residence. If they fail to do so and want to cast a ballot, they have to return to their 
previous address to vote. For obvious reasons, this is costly (in terms of time, energy and, 
sometimes, money) and renders voting unlikely. This was empirically confirmed also in France, 
a European country where voter registration is not automatic like in the United States and where 
                                                 
5 A transnational political activity may be defined as ‘various forms of direct cross-border participation in the 
politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees […] as well as their indirect participation via the 
political institutions of the host country’ (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 762).  
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the ‘malinscription’ (registration at one’s former address) was found to significantly hinder 
electoral participation (Braconnier et Dormagen 2007, chapter 2).  
 
These arguments related to voter registration and malinscription are highly applicable 
to transnational electoral participation. To better explain this, we need to distinguish between 
two types of sending countries on the basis of their electoral legislation. The first type does not 
allow its citizens to vote externally in domestic elections. Emigrants from such countries find 
themselves de facto in an extreme situation of malinscription. If they wish to vote, they must 
return home, which implies an international journey and usually means they encounter more 
adverse conditions than within-country residential movers. In normal circumstances, very few 
voters would travel long distances and pay money for the mere sake of casting a vote in an 
election.  
 
The second type of sending country allows for external voting in domestic elections. 
Emigrants from such countries can vote from the receiving country (i.e. their new domicile). 
But usually they still face a considerable constraint that substantially reduces their propensity 
to vote: registration. Most countries require their citizens to reregister when they want to vote 
from abroad (Green 2007, 98). Like in the case of within-country residential mobility or, 
actually, even more because of the geographical distance, this increases the costs of voting. The 
registration period often takes place before the election time where many citizens, not only 
abroad, are still unaware of the fact that an election will be held. They are thus particularly 
likely to be unaware of the registration procedure and deadlines.  
 
As part of the pioneering empirical research on electoral behaviour, scholars have 
emphasised that voting is a social act (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudett 1948; Campbell et al. 
1960). People often participate in elections because they are told to do so and/or feel pressure 
to comply with the social norm of participation (Green and Shachar 2000). In other words, 
electoral participation is fostered by mobilisation, either by politicians and political activists 
(‘direct mobilisation’ according to Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 25) or by one’s peers 
(‘indirect mobilisation’). The degree of either form of mobilisation is however substantially 
lower for mobile individuals. They are more difficult to reach by political campaigners and less 
socially connected, which reduces the social pressure that may compel them to vote 
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(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 156-157). For example, in a work with a self-explanatory title 
(‘You Want to Vote Where Everybody Knows Your Name’), Mark Franklin (2005) 
demonstrated that American young adults that moved out of their parents’ neighbourhood are 
substantially less reactive to the electoral context (i.e. mobilisation) than their counterparts who 
stayed close to the family nest.  
 
If within-country movers can easily escape being mobilised by activists or friends, this 
is particularly true for emigrants. In fact, direct mobilisation abroad varies in intensity 
depending on the likely impact of external votes on the election outcome. Since resources are 
scarce, campaigners have an interest in going transnational only when the diaspora is 
sufficiently large to affect the overall domestic result or when a certain share of electoral 
mandates is reserved for citizens abroad. Moreover, they can reach only emigrants well 
integrated in the diaspora’s networks and/or living in countries/cities, where campaigning is 
cost-effective. These are, however, the same emigrants who are most likely to experience at 
least some indirect mobilisation, i.e. those who remain connected with their co-nationals. In 
contrast, emigrants who prefer integrating in the receiving country and/or avoid contacts with 
their co-nationals miss the mobilisation pressure altogether. Their decision to vote or abstain is 
entirely dependent on their attitudinal attributes, such as the perception of the voting act as a 
civic duty, interest in (domestic) politics, and perceived stakes and closeness of the election. 
However, and in contrast with within-country residential mobility, some of these attitudes are 
also likely to be negatively altered by emigration. In other words, besides increasing the costs, 
emigration is also likely to decrease the benefits of voting.  
 
When citizens move from one region (or federalized state) to another in their 
motherland, this does not, ceteris paribus, alter the salience of the national election. The 
election campaign still makes the headlines in the media, and is discussed in workplaces, 
associations and local bars. In most cases, public policy resulting from the election (e.g. 
taxation), will affect all the constituent parts of the national territory equally. By contrast, 
emigrants are generally much less affected by public policy adopted in their country of origin 
(for example, they pay taxes abroad) and therefore typically feel less concerned about the 
election outcome. They also face substantial obstacles when accessing information on domestic 
politics in general, and the upcoming elections in particular. Those obstacles have lately greatly 
  
 
7 
 
 
 
diminished thanks to modern technologies and social media. Yet, in comparison to their 
counterparts back home, emigrants are much less exposed to domestic political information and 
have to make more effort to access it. Their interest in the campaign and the election itself is 
thus strongly dependent on their degree of politicisation, which in turn hinges on their previous 
political socialisation and educational attainment. It is true that, under certain conditions such 
as high emigration costs or a wage-ratio favourable to highly skilled workers in the receiving 
countries (Chiswick 1999), emigrant’s degree of politicisation can be expected to be relatively 
high because of emigrant’s self-selection (i.e. their above-average social status). In such cases, 
the negative effect of lower stakes in domestic elections may be attenuated.  
 
However, even if emigrants overcome all the preceding hurdles and remain motivated 
to vote, there is still one further step to make. Namely the voting act itself, which can be 
extraordinarily demanding. Before emigration, casting a ballot consists in a journey to the 
nearest polling station which, in most economically developed nations, is typically located 
walking distance from voters’ domiciles. After emigration, unless external postal or online 
voting is provided, voting necessitates a visit to a diplomatic mission, a cultural institute or a 
similar institution where external polling stations tend to be opened. Such places are usually 
located in the receiving country’s capital and, at best, some other large cities. For emigrants 
who are not fortunate to live in the neighbourhood of their country’s representative institutions, 
the journey to the polling station is thus much more time-consuming. Moreover, if they live 
outside the capital (or one of the large cities in which it is also possible to cast a ballot), voting 
is also a financial burden. If emigrants decide to vote directly in their home country, which may 
enable them to jump the registration stage, the costs in terms of time and money become even 
greater. 
 
Overall, there are many reasons why emigration depresses one’s propensity to vote. On 
the empirical level, this theoretical expectation is largely corroborated by all the available 
evidence outside the CEE-10 (cf. Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007, 31).  
 
At the same time, the extent to which emigrants’ voting rates are lower than the domestic 
rates may, of course, vary. Drawing from the theoretical literature on voting behaviour, two 
factors can explain most of the variation.  
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The first is the legislation concerning voter registration and the act of external voting 
itself. The nature of its effect is simple. As Lafleur and Chelious note (2011, 111), ‘countries 
that have easy procedures to access external voting rights (such as Belgium or Italy) also have 
higher levels of participation.’ In contrast, if external voting is burdensome and, in particular, 
if it requires prior reregistration ahead of the election, this is susceptible to reduce participation. 
 
The other factor pertains to the size and location of the country’s diaspora.  All else 
being equal, we can expect higher participation by emigrants that are part of a larger and more 
geographically concentrated community of emigrants. The reason is that such a community is 
likely to attract a stronger and more efficient mobilisation effort by domestic parties (direct 
mobilisation), to be characterised by a more developed and dense network of emigrants’ 
associations (indirect mobilisation) and, potentially, to be capable of putting pressure on the 
home-country authorities to adopt more liberal legislation on external voting (lower voting 
costs).  
 
Nevertheless, despite its hypothetically positive effect on emigrants’ turnout, diaspora 
size likely negatively affects the overall (i.e. nationwide) voter turnout rate. This is because, 
although voting rates of large communities of emigrants may be higher than those of smaller 
communities, they will, for all the reasons sketched above, never reach the domestic level. In 
other words, the more people emigrate, the higher emigrants’ turnout (i.e. the share of emigrants 
who vote among all emigrants), but the lower the national turnout rate since a larger share of 
the total electorate has to vote from abroad where it is always costlier than back home.  
 
These are the theoretical propositions that guide, inform and, at the same time, are tested 
in the ensuing, more empirical, sections of this article.  
 
2. Data  
This section reviews the sources and limitations of the data used throughout the article.  
The following empirical analyses require notably the calculation of external voting rates (i.e. 
the share of emigrants who vote in their country of origin). These rates correspond to the 
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number of votes cast from abroad divided by the total number of CEE-10 emigrants that are 
eligible to vote in each election. I obtained the number of votes casts from abroad by courtesy 
of the national authorities of the ten countries at hand. As for the number of emigrants eligible 
to vote, I rely on mirror statistics from the host countries since reliable statistics from sending 
countries are unavailable. I focus on the principal destinations of CEE-10 migrants which are, 
as further discussed in Section 3 below, Western Europe, the United States and, a few other 
specific destinations for some of the CEE-10 citizens: Turkey (for Bulgarians), the Czech 
Republic (for Slovaks), Moldova (for Romanians).6 This focus is motivated by two reasons.  
 
First, according to the available statistics compiled by the World Bank (Table 18 in the 
Electronic Appendix), the number of CEE-10-born residents in the rest of the world remained 
remarkably stable during the period under study. This means that the number of CEE-10 
citizens living abroad increased in the first two post-communist decades exclusively because of 
emigration to the principal destinations. Therefore, when estimating the impact of emigration 
on the change in voter turnout, the reliance on the principal destinations does not induce a bias.7 
The second reason is that for the principal destinations, yearly estimates of the number of 
residents from each CEE-10 are usually available and, therefore, the external voting rate can be 
calculated relatively accurately for each election.  
 
The data come from official records such as censuses and population registers published 
by the national authorities in the host countries or research reports and databases that draw on 
such official records. These sources are presented in Table 1. Most of them present estimations 
                                                 
6 In the case of Moldova, there has been no significant emigration from Romania. However, in the post-1989 
period (and in particular after 2004), many Moldovans applied for Romanian citizenship, motivated by domestic 
political and economic conditions and, in particular, less stringent travel restrictions for Romanian citizens in 
Western Europe. Because of cultural and historical proximity, the Romanian authorities tended to answer 
favourably to these requests, which, however, were typically not followed by emigration to Romania (Knot 2014). 
Therefore, those Moldovans who benefited from this ‘passportisation’ became Romanian citizens abroad with 
voting rights (see Table 17 in the Electronic Appendix for detailed statistics).  
7 A bias may theoretically occur in the calculation of external rates due to an exclusion of those CEE-10 emigrants 
who emigrated before democratization. The potential for such a bias is however limited since pre-1989 emigrants 
were typically stripped of citizenship and voting rights after emigration by communist authorities (Dobreva 2013, 
3). If some of pre-1989 emigrants reacquired the right to vote after 1989 while staying abroad, this actually renders 
the following estimates of the impact of emigration on voter turnout conservative. If the re-enfranchised pre-1989 
emigrants were included, the external voting rates would be even weaker than this article portrays. Moreover, the 
exclusion of pre-1989 emigrants rules out the opposite bias, which would consist in including in the calculation of 
external voting rates those pre-1989 emigrants who would not be on the electoral rolls of their countries of origin.  
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of emigrants’ stocks by citizenship.8 To determine the number of those who are in the voting 
age, I use the available demographic statistics from the same sources, which estimate that 90 % 
of CEE-10 emigrants are mobile adults in a productive age (see sources in Table 1: Holland et 
al. 2011, 52; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002, 49).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The current data probably underestimate the degree of the CEE-10 emigration since official 
sources only imperfectly record migration flows that may take place without a direct contact 
between migrants and the receiving country’s state authorities, such as free movement in the 
European Union or clandestine migration. Therefore, although all estimation of stocks is fraught 
with difficulty and the available data has its limits, the emigration figures used in this article are 
conservative and the effects of emigration described below may be, in reality, even more dramatic.  
 
 The other data used in empirical analyses pertain to population size, electorate size, and 
nationwide voter turnout rates, and legal provisions for external voting. The population data come 
from the World Bank statistics.9 Electorate size and voter turnout rates come from Nohlen and 
Stöver 2010, which was supplemented for the most recent elections with data available on the 
websites of the national electoral authorities. As for legal provisions for external voting, they were 
obtained from secondary sources and questionnaires sent to the CEE-10 national electoral 
authorities (see the note under Table 4 for details). The original data for all statistics cited in the 
following sections are available in the Electronic Appendix.  
3. Emigration from CEE10 
 In this section, I estimate the total number of CEE-10 emigrants that were eligible to 
vote during the period under study. This number provides the denominator in the calculation 
                                                 
8  The principal exception is the United States statistics. It gives the yearly number of new permanent residents by 
country of birth. This means that, if some permanent residents decide to permanently leave the country during the 
period under study (which is not very likely given the difficulty of obtaining the status), the figure may slightly 
overestimate the stock. If it is the case, this his however attenuated by: a) the general tendency of the present data 
to underestimate the emigrations flows; b) the relatively weak contribution of the United States to the total 
emigration figure when compared with Western Europe.    
9 World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators, accessed October 27, 2014. 
10 The present section provides just a brief summary of a more detailed survey of emigration from the CEE-10 
that is available in Section 1 of the Electronic Appendix.  
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emigrants’ voting rates. The numerator is the number of votes cast from abroad, which is 
introduced in the final empirical section (Section 5).  
  
From a historical perspective, East-West migration has been commonplace in modern 
Europe. Although the intensity and nature of the process has varied, Central and Eastern Europe 
has been a region of emigration since the industrial revolution, and Western Europe – followed 
by United States, Latin America and Australia – has been the main destination of CEE migrants 
(Kazczmarczyk and Okólski 2005; Goździak 2014, 1). Opportunities for such emigration were, 
however, severely curtailed by most communist regimes. Consequently, many western 
observers expected that the particular conjuncture of the fall of communism would lead to a 
surge in the East-West migrations flows. Their alarming predictions, spreading fears among 
Western publics, however proved unsubstantiated. In the first democratic decade, the number 
of CEE-10 citizens living in the principal emigration destinations increased solely by 0.8 
million, reaching 1.8 in total (see Table 2). The ensuing developments (see below) suggest that 
the limited degree of post-communist emigration in the 1990s can be mainly attributed to scarce 
legal opportunities for employment in the West. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In fact, in the second democratic decade, the progressive dismantling of legal obstacles 
and, in particular, opening of labour in markets in Western Europe considerably reinvigorated 
the post-communist emigration flow. The increasingly favourable climate to labour migration, 
brought mainly by the CEE-10’s accession to the European Union (in 2004 and 2007), 
multiplied the number of CEE immigrants living in the EU-15 (i.e. the fifteen pre-2004 member 
states) by five between 2000 and 2010. Altogether, by the end of the second post-communist 
decade, the number of CEE-10 citizens living in the principal emigration destination more than 
tripled and reached a striking 6.3 million (see Table 2), which corresponded to 6.3 % of the 
total CEE-10 population (see Figure 1). To be sure, there was considerable variation within the 
region, which can be accounted for by several factors such as economic development or cultural 
proximity (Pytlikova 2006). The proportion of emigrants ranged from a modest 1.2 % in the 
economically advanced Czech Republic to a striking 12.4 % in less developed Romania.  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As regards electorates, given the aforementioned over-representation of adults among 
emigrants (see Section 2), it can be estimated that 5.5 % of the CEE-10 voters lived abroad by 
the sixth democratic election (see Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The expatriates’ electoral strength did not pass unnoticed in the eyes of politicians back 
home. To the bewilderment of the locals, political advertising in narrowly-known foreign 
languages such as Polish and/or Romanian have become commonplace in a number of Western 
cities like London or Dublin since the mid-2000s. Domestic political meetings abroad, i.e. 
transnational political events like the one held in Castellon and described in the introduction of 
this article, are no longer unheard-of rarities. This mobilisation may have affected expatriates’ 
voting rates. Nonetheless, as described in the first section of this article, external voting rates 
do not depend solely on diaspora size (and the related political mobilisation) but also on the 
legislation concerning the voting rights of non-residents and the provisions for external voting. 
These aspects are reviewed in the next section.  
 
4. Voting Rights of Emigrants and External Voting Provisions in CEE 
In order to understand the repercussions of strong emigration on voter turnout in the ten 
post-communist democracies, I show in this section that for each country we need to gather 
empirical data to answer four fundamental questions. First, do CEE emigrants keep their voting 
rights? Second, do they remain registered as eligible voters after having left their motherland? 
Third, is external voting provided for? Fourth, if it is possible to vote from abroad, how costly 
is it in terms of time, money and human energy? I now explore the answers to each question in 
turn.   
 
As regards the first question, some liberal democracies such as Ireland condition the 
right to vote by permanent residency in the national territory. Others, notably Great Britain and 
former British colonies, specify the maximal period for which a citizen can stay abroad in order 
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not to lose their right to vote (cf. Navarro, Morales & Gratschew 2007, 11). In CEE-10, the only 
country to apply a limitation of this sort was Hungary. Throughout the first six democratic 
elections, the Hungarian authorities followed the Irish model and restricted the right to vote to 
citizens permanently residing in the country.11 Nevertheless, this restriction did not 
disenfranchise most Hungarian emigrants since they did not have a particular reason for 
reporting their emigration to the state authorities. Most kept their official permanent residence 
in Hungary – and thus their registration on the electoral rolls – although they were physically 
living elsewhere. This is obvious from a comparison of the official national Hungarian statistics 
on emigration and the mirror statistics on the number of Hungarian migrants provided by the 
receiving countries. The former figure, which de facto corresponds to the number of 
disenfranchised emigrants, is in some years up to 20 times lower than the latter figure, which 
gives the total number of emigrants (cf. Gödri, Soltész and Bodacz-Nagy 2014, 30).12  
 
More generally, in all CEE-10, electoral rolls are kept on the basis of population 
registers. Voter registration is thereby automatic, which answers the second question raised 
above. Unless they lose citizenship or, until 2010 in the Hungarian case, officially declare 
permanent residence abroad, CEE citizens remain registered to vote from the time they reach 
the voting age of 18 years to grave. This has an important implication for voter turnout. The 
automatic nature of voter registration means that, excepting the pre-2010 official Hungarian 
emigrants, all post-communist emigrants who possess their home country’s citizenship remain 
an integral part of their home country’s electorate. In other words, when nationwide voter 
turnout rates are calculated, all adult citizens who stay abroad at the time of an election are 
included. This leads to the third question concerning the possibility of external voting.     
 
 At the international level, the adoption of external voting in nationwide elections has 
become the norm over the recent decades, which can be attributed notably to the third wave of 
democratisation and the growing international migration after the fall of the Iron Curtain 
(Nohlen and Grotz 2007, 65; Lafleur & Chelius 2011, 102-103). As of May 2007, it was 
provided for in 115 countries and territories in the world, of which 41 were in Europe (cf. 
                                                 
11 This limitation was lifted in May 2010 by the right-wing Fidesz that wished to enfranchise Hungarian ethnic 
minorities living in neighbouring countries.  
12 Given its negligible magnitude, the disenfranchisement of the fraction of Hungarian emigrants is not taken into 
account in the estimations made in this article.   
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Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007, 11). Post-communist democracies have conformed to 
this general trend; most of them enacted provisions for external voting in the early 1990s. The 
only CEE-10 countries that did not offer their citizens an opportunity to vote from abroad 
shortly after democratisation were Hungary and the two successor states of the former 
Czechoslovakia. In Hungary, external voting did not exist under communism and, in view of 
the post-communist residency condition for the right to vote, it is not surprising that it was 
introduced late (before the legislative election of 2006). Until 2010, it benefited only those 
Hungarian citizens who were staying abroad, at least officially (see above), on temporary basis. 
The late adoption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is more astonishing since external voting 
was practiced in pre-1989 Czechoslovak elections. For more than a decade, the two new 
democracies thus applied a narrower version of voting rights than the preceding communist 
dictatorship. Moreover, when the two countries eventually adopted the necessary legal 
provisions in 2000 (the Czech Republic) and 2004 (Slovakia), their character remained fairly 
restrictive, as the ensuing paragraphs demonstrate.  
 
After the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak reforms, citizens of all CEE-10 could vote from 
abroad. Whether they were actually likely to do so largely depended on the concrete procedure 
of external voting. Its complexity has varied both over time and across the ten democracies. 
Although casting a vote remained vastly easier for domestic voters, external voting tended, in 
line with the aforesaid democratisation zeitgeist, to become simpler and more flexible. In step 
with the increasing emigration, the number of external polling stations has steadily risen – for 
instance, in Bulgaria, it increased from 157 in 2001 to 428 in 2014 (OSCE 2001, 2015). CEE 
emigrants were also progressively granted several options for taking part in national elections. 
The most common was voting in person at their country’s foreign representations, such as 
embassies or consulates. But, often they could also cast their vote by post or, in the case of 
Estonia, even electronically. Registration for external voting has become less constrained too 
and, in Romania, Bulgaria and, in practice, Slovenia (cf. below), it was removed altogether.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
This being said, the cross-national variation remains strong (see Table 4). In the seven 
remaining countries, registration is still required and, in cases such as the Czech Republic or 
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Slovakia, it has to be accomplished more than one month ahead of the election day. The two 
successor states of former Czechoslovakia adopted the overall least voter-friendly legal 
provisions. As well as the early registration requirement, they allow for only one form of 
external voting (personal in the Czech case and, less demanding, postal in the Slovak case). In 
case of Romania, the absence of registration, favourable to emigrants’ participation, has been 
at least partly dampened by logistical problems in the organisation of external voting. Since the 
second democratic decade, Romania’s have expatriates regularly denounced the insufficient 
capacity of polling stations abroad, resulting in hours of waiting and sometimes even preventing 
them from casting a vote. Moreover, Romania has also disjointed legislative and presidential 
elections, which used to be held simultaneously until 2004 (Comşa 2015). Given the high costs 
of external voting, this reform is particularly likely to depress external turnout in the less 
important election type. In the Romanian case, this is, unlike in most other CEE-10, legislative 
elections. By contrast, Slovenia has clearly the most favourable institutional setup for 
expatriates’ electoral participation. Not only are both postal and personal external voting 
allowed but, since a legislative reform of 2006, the Slovenian State Election Commission sends 
ballots to all Slovenian citizens who are residing abroad even if they do not demand it (OSCE 
2012, 21). Expatriates are urged to report their new domicile and the addresses of all those 
citizens who have not declared a permanent address in Slovenia are searched for. When a 
Slovenian citizen visits a representation mission, for whatever reason, they are asked to 
communicate their current address (Trampuš 2007). The registration of Slovenians abroad thus 
becomes, de facto, automatic. What is more, the Slovenian Electoral Commission also acts as 
a mobilisation agent since, by sending election materials to all citizens abroad, it reminds them 
of the upcoming election. In 2008, it sent out approximately 40 000 ballots (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2009, 7), which according to my estimates presented in Section 3, covers the bulk of 
Slovenia’s expatriates.  
 
The present section explored the conditions for transnational electoral participation in 
CEE. Its findings have two main implications. First, as voter registration has been automatic 
and, with the minor pre-2010 Hungarian exception, unrelated to residency status, the strong 
emigration is likely to have negatively impacted voter turnout in the region. Second, given the 
over-time and cross-country differences in the legal provision for external voting (and, of 
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course, in the emigration rates), the impact of emigration was presumably unequal across 
countries and period. This is empirically tested in the next and final section of this article.  
   
5. Emigration, External Voting and Voter Turnout Dynamics in CEE 
As mentioned in the introduction, nationwide voter turnout severely slumped in the post-
communist region over the first two democratic decades. By 2012, when all of the CEE-10 had 
held at least six democratic elections, the average voter turnout rate decreased by 25.1 
percentage points from 81.5 % (in the founding democratic elections) to 56.4 % (in the sixth 
election). Since the Second World War, no other democratic region has recorded such a 
dramatic fall of electoral participation (Kostelka 2015: Chapter 1). The conventional 
explanations of the phenomenon pertain to disenchantment with democratic politics and lower 
electoral stakes (cf. Kostadinova 2003; Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2009, see Kostelka 
2014 for a dicussion). With the important exception of a study by Comşa (2015), who finds that 
emigration contributes to the decline in Romania, this factor has not been taken into account by 
the existing studies on post-communist voter turnout dynamics. This final section addresses the 
emigration question by fulfilling two tasks. It first analyses variation in external voting rates in 
CEE elections, which also allows for testing the new theory from Section 1. Subsequently, it 
estimates the impact of emigration on the post-communist voter turnout decline.  
 
External Voting Rates 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of both the average nationwide voting rate and the average 
external voting rate in the first six democratic elections. Figure 3 breaks down these statistics 
by country. To calculate the external voting rates, the estimated number of CEE citizens in the 
voting age that live abroad (see Section 3) is entered in the denominator. In the numerator, there 
is the number of votes cast from abroad, which come from the official records of the national 
electoral authorities and which is presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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It is evident that external voter turnout is much lower than domestic, in line with the 
theory outlined earlier in this article. In an average legislative election that provides for external 
voting, less than 20 % of CEE citizens abroad cast a vote. In addition, this rate has been 
progressively declining, copying the trend in the nationwide turnout. This suggests that post-
communist emigrants were affected by similar factors as their fellow citizens living in the 
motherland. For instance, even when residing abroad, CEE citizens probably saw greater stakes 
in the first democratic elections than in the most recent ones.13  
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Even though the external voting rates are much lower than domestic voting rates in all 
CEE-10, Figure 3 reveals that there is still a considerable cross-national and over-time variation 
in the magnitude of the rates. At the end of the period, they range from more than 32 % in 
Slovenia’s fifth election to a little more than 1 % in Romania’s sixth election. To explore this 
variation systematically, I ran five OLS regression analyses of the external voting rates from 
the second democratic decade.14  
 
The principal independent variables are the factors advanced by the theory formulated 
in section 1, which are legal provisions for external voting, and diaspora size. Among legal 
provisions, I operationalise registration rules, which are the most constraining and burdensome 
element of external voting as they may double the effort necessary to cast a vote.15 The variable 
Registration measures how many days ahead of an election it is necessary to register before an 
election to be eligible to vote from abroad. If no registration is required, the variable is set to 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the statistics from the first democratic years may slightly exaggerate the initial electoral 
zeal of post-communist emigrants. As accurate estimates are unavailable, the total number of emigrants (i.e. the 
denominator in the calculation of external voter turnout) does not comprise those pre-1989 emigrants who, after 
their disenfranchisement by communist authorities (see Note 6), re-acquired the right to vote without resettling in 
their country of origin. Although their absolute numbers were generally low and declining in time because 
mortality brought about by ageing, their contribution to external voter turnout may have not been, in some cases, 
entirely negligible before the acceleration of post-communist emigration in the 2000s. Especially in Estonia and 
Latvia, the re-acquirement of citizenship was facilitated for pre-1989 emigrants to reduce the demographic weight 
of the two countries’ Russian-speaking minorities, perceived as a threat to national independence. 
14 The analysis does not include the external rates from the first decade (the first four democratic elections) since 
they are less reliable (cf. Note 13), or unavailable as some countries adopted external voting only later on (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) or did not archive the data on external voting (Slovenia).  
15 Other attributes of external voting are not tested given the small number of observations.  
  
 
18 
 
 
 
zero. As for diaspora size, the variable Electorate Abroad corresponds to the share of emigrants 
as a percentage of their country’s electorate. The other confounding factors that impact voter 
turnout (for a general overview, see Blais 2006), are controlled via Domestic Turnout.16 The 
logic is straightforward: the higher the domestic voting rate, be it because of the election context 
(e.g. closeness of the election) or a long-term cultural traits favourable to participation (Voicu 
and Comşa 2014), the higher the external voting rate should be. The descriptive statistics for 
all these quantitative variables are presented in Table 5. In addition to the quantitative variables, 
all the regression models incorporate dummy variables for Slovenia and Romania because of 
the aforementioned exceptional activism of Slovenia’s electoral commission, and the logistical 
problems and importance of the presidential election in Romania. Finally, to take into account 
the (short) panel structure of the data, the last two regression models apply panel-corrected 
standard errors and fixed effects (Beck 2001).17  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The results, presented in Table 6, conform to the theoretical expectations formulated in 
section 1. All the regression coefficients are in the hypothesised direction and are statistically 
significant. According to Model 4, the fact of having to register for external voting decreases 
external voter turnout by about 0.11 percentage points for each extra day that separate the 
registration deadline from the actual election. Conversely, every increase in the number of 
voters abroad (as a percentage of the total electorate), boosts external voter turnout by 0.5 
(Model 4) or 0.3 points (Model 5). Finally, in all models – even when registration and diaspora 
size are controlled for – external turnout is substantially higher in Slovenia and lower in 
Romania. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The current subsection provides a first piece of empirical evidence on how legal 
provisions for external voting and diaspora size affect external voting rates. Of course, given 
the limited number of observations and the resulting parsimonious operationalisation, caution 
                                                 
16 The domestic voting rate corresponds to nationwide turnout after the removal of emigration from both the 
denominator and numerator. Its calculation is formally presented in Step 1 in Table 7.    
17 The Woolridge test for autocorrelation indicated that there is no need to control for autocorrelation (p = 0.11).   
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should be exercised in the interpretation.18 At the same time, this section supports the theoretical 
expectation that external voting rates tend to be always lower than domestic voting rates. 
Considering the magnitude of post-communist emigration flows, such low external turnout 
must significantly hurt nationwide turnout. This is further explored in the next sub-section.   
The Impact of Emigration on Voter Turnout 
After having ascertained the sources of variation in external voting rates, this subsection 
uses these rates (i.e. the estimated number of emigrant abstainers) to quantify the impact of 
emigration on the post-communist voter turnout. Following an approach commonly employed 
in the study of how demographic change affect voter turnout (e.g. Blais et al. 2004), I compute 
counterfactual turnout rates that would have been observed if the number of CEE-10 expatriates 
had not increased after the first democratic elections. The focus is on the sixth democratic 
election and the procedure is presented in detail in Table 7. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
      
The calculated counterfactual voter turnout rates and their divergence from the real rates 
are presented in Table 8. This divergence corresponds to the impact of emigration on the post-
communist turnout. The table shows that, had the number of post-communist emigrants 
remained stably low as in the first election, the average voter turnout rate in the sixth democratic 
election would have been higher by 2.1 percentage points (58.5 instead of 56.4). According to 
this estimate, emigration accounts for almost one tenth (8.5 %) of the post-communist decline 
in nationwide turnout.  
 
Nevertheless, Table 8 also shows that the extent to which emigration contributes to the 
decline naturally varies across countries as it depends on the magnitude of the emigration 
outflows and the external turnout rates. In addition, given that post-communist emigration has 
strongly, and rather linearly, accelerated since 2004, what matters is also the timing of the 
                                                 
18 The current analysis is limited by the impossibility of incorporating more institutional factors that may affect 
external turnout such as the existence of special constituencies for non-resident citizens. Nevertheless, the results 
reported in Table 6 hold even when, instead of this article’s dataset, OECD data is used (see Table 21 in the 
Electronic Appendix). Moreover, the theory advanced in Section 1 is also corroborated by the more qualitative 
exploration of the variation in external turnout, which is provided in Section 2 of the Electronic Appendix. 
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elections. The later the sixth democratic legislative election was held, the stronger the 
magnitude of emigration and the larger its impact on voter turnout. Taking all these aspects into 
account, it is clear why the strongest ‘emigration-related’ decline can be observed in Lithuania 
(5 percentage points). Although Lithuania’s external voting rates are average (cf. Ffigure 3), its 
emigration is strong and, the sixth democratic election was held only in 2012. At the other 
extreme, the effect is small to non-existent in the low-emigration countries: Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and, notably, Slovenia. In the last case, because of a strong degree of transnational 
participation by the Slovenian expatriates, the effect of emigration is practically nil despite the 
late timing of the sixth election. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 It should be emphasised that the calculated external voter turnout figures are strongly 
conservative since, as mentioned above, they understate the real magnitude of CEE migration. 
If the pre-1989, clandestine, seasonal, and post-2004 free movement migration flows could be 
more accurately measured, the estimated contribution of emigration to the post-communist 
decline would be likely to exceed 10 %. 
 
 The logic of the diluting effect of emigration on voter turnout in CEE is reminiscent of 
a theme in Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol’s world-famous novel ‘Dead Souls’. Tsarist Russia taxed 
landowners as a function of the number of serfs they possessed. As the censuses were conducted 
only irregularly, serfs’ mortality rates meant the official registers were fast becoming outdated. 
As a consequence, landowners had to pay taxes for deceased serfs they no longer possessed 
(i.e. the dead souls). In the post-communist case, it is emigration that renders voter registers 
outdated. The millions of CEE expatriates are fortunately not dead. Yet, they are distant, which, 
as this article theoretically underpins and empirically demonstrates, heavily matters for the 
probability of going to the polls. While citizens’ voting rights are not altered, emigration 
fundamentally transforms the conditions for electoral participation. Even when the institutional 
setting for external voting is the most favourable, external voting costs are much higher than in 
the case of domestic voting. The rising number of ‘distant souls’ thus mechanically increase the 
magnitude of the post-communist voter turnout. In a way, it distorts electoral statistics (and 
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their understanding), as the rising number of dead souls distorted fiscal statistics in the 19th-
century Russia.  
6. Conclusion 
 
This article addressed the question of emigration and voter turnout. Drawing on the 
existing literature, it theorised why emigrants’ propensity to vote in their homeland’s elections, 
i.e. to participate transnationally, is typically low and, therefore, why emigration is likely to 
affect negatively nationwide turnout rates.  
 
The empirical part first explored the magnitude of the post-communist emigration. It 
showed that, notably in the second decade of freedom, emigration rates strongly increased and 
the share of expatriates in the total Central and East European population exceeded 6 %. 
Subsequently, I overviewed the CEE legal provisions for voter registration and external voting. 
The overwhelmingly inclusive character of voter registration, i.e. its automaticity and lifelong 
durability, entails that, in Central and Eastern Europe, expatriates do matter for national turnout 
rates. Wherever they are on the globe, expatriates are included in the official turnout statistics. 
The empirical analyses corroborated that the extent to which post-communist expatriates 
participate in domestic elections depends, to a large extent, on legal provisions for external 
voting, of which registration rules, and diaspora size. At the same time, post-communist 
transnational participation is in all countries and elections much weaker than domestic 
participation. Emigration thus significantly contributed to the post-communist decline in voter 
turnout. According to my estimates, the rising number of ‘distant souls’ and their low propensity 
to vote account for, at least, 8.5 % of the decline in the first six democratic elections. The 
magnitude of this negative effect may continue to increase as emigration has kept rising.   
 
Moreover, some studies suggest that, in addition to the direct effects studied here, 
emigration can reduce voter turnout, more indirectly by affecting the domestic electorate that 
did not emigrate. Godman and Hiskey (2008) find that in Mexico emigration reduces electoral 
participation of ‘those left behind’ since they increasingly rely on more the transnational ties 
(and remittances) instead of formal institutions. And other studies also showed that emigrants 
(and also emigrant returnees) have an influence on preferences, values, and behaviours of 
citizens back home (e.g. Chauvet et Mercier 2014, Péréz-Armendariz 2014, Omar-Mahmoud 
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et al. 2015). Future studies should explore this potential additional effect in the CEE-10 through 
a micro-level analysis.  
  
In any case, if policy-makers in post-communist democracies and other nations 
recording high emigration rates are worried by falling nationwide turnout, they should, among 
other measures, tackle legal provisions for external voting. They can either, like Ireland, 
disenfranchise expatriates or, like Slovenia, deploy much larger efforts to mobilise their 
diasporas and facilitate external voting. The first remedy will be more efficient (eliminating the 
problem of emigration all together) but, at the same time, will clash with the global trend of 
democratic deepening and expatriates’ enfranchisement. Enhancing mobilisation and 
facilitating external voting will have a more uncertain effect but will be congruent with the 
current zeitgeist, which recognises expatriates as full-fledged members of home country’s 
political community.  
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Table 1 Sources of Emigration Data by Destination  
Destination Sources Type of Data 
Western 
Europe 
Holland, Dawn, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes, and Pavel Paluchowski. 2011. Labour Mobility within the EU - 
The Impact of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements - Final Report. London: National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research, United Kingdom.  
Complemented for 2010-2012 with Duszczyk, Maciej, and Kamil Matuszczyk. 2014. Migration in the 21st Century from the 
Perspective of CEE Countries - an Opportunity or a Threat? Warsaw: Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute.  
Note: The latter study is compatible and draws on the former study.  
Original estimations 
combining Eurostat and 
OECD data.   
USA 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2002. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 2000. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
United States. Department of Homeland Security. 2011. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010. Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. United States.  
Department of Homeland Security. 2013. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2012. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
Records of legal 
permanent residents 
(without U.S. citizenship) 
Turkey 
(Bulgarians 
only) 
Global Bilateral Migration Database, World Bank Group and Ç. Özden, C. Parsons, M. Schiff and T. L. Walmsley (2011) 
“Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960-2000”, World Bank Economic Review 
25(1):12-56. Updated version from 2011 with year 2010, downloaded from http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed October 7, 
2014).  
Note: WB statistics are based on origin and not on citizenship. Therefore, the total estimate was corrected by an estimate of the 
number of Bulgarian emigrants living in Turkey who kept Bulgarian citizenship (about 380 000 at the end of the period) obtained 
from Smilov, Daniel, and Elena Jileva. 2010. Country Report: Bulgaria. EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Badia Fiesolana, San 
Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, p. 19.  
Census and population 
register records 
Czech 
Republic 
(Slovaks 
only) 
Cizinci podle státního občanství k 31. 12. - územní srovnání [Foreigners by citizenship as at 31 December - territorial 
comparison]. Records produced by the Czech Alien Police, data downloaded from the website of the Czech Statistical Office, 
www.czso.cz, accessed November 3, 2014.  
Police records 
Moldova 
(Romanians 
only) 
Panainte, Sergiu, Victoria Nedelciuc, and Ovidiu Voicu. 2013. Redobândirea Cetăteniei Române: O politică ce Capăcă Viziune 
? [Romanian Citizenship: a policy that acquires vision?]. Bucurest: Fundatia Soros Romania. 
Records of Romania’s 
National Citizenship 
Authority 
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Table 2 The Estimated Number of CEE Citizens Living in the Principal Emigration Destinations 1990-2012 (Absolute Numbers) 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Total 
1990 348313 31343 13461 80469 5156 10075 403909 117719 10868 27982 1049295 
1991 353437 33560 13999 82738 5761 11099 431503 143708 12634 28349 1116788 
1992 359082 35863 14727 84784 6751 12393 465587 168679 14591 28729 1191186 
1993 364807 38111 15472 86624 8049 13946 502200 193368 16703 29156 1268435 
1994 370588 40213 16320 88260 9504 15721 539207 216562 35923 29604 1361901 
1995 377293 42427 17122 89923 10919 17696 562186 241892 61846 30056 1451361 
1996 384381 44791 18023 91877 12496 20089 587314 268913 75802 30524 1534209 
1997 392295 47153 18952 93603 14037 22327 608913 296491 81403 30983 1606157 
1998 395034 49224 20234 94246 16122 24818 611164 299712 80806 31849 1623210 
1999 406429 50985 21050 98344 17730 27279 644176 347243 82457 32433 1728126 
2000 424081 56760 22186 99288 19653 32446 675784 397591 89354 32792 1849935 
2001 459360 67301 24700 105797 22000 39307 708035 464301 102617 32957 2026375 
2002 500182 78340 27007 106928 24738 53234 736264 555886 120897 32657 2236133 
2003 545890 82145 30008 107355 29374 63275 804347 726231 139582 34864 2563071 
2004 584981 73550 32481 103578 30503 80913 875625 906393 128363 33963 2850350 
2005 624742 81395 37545 110070 39736 117259 1030512 1080041 159722 36289 3317311 
2006 674854 107673 41125 128073 60381 163556 1317916 1315566 182052 37853 4029049 
2007 749034 125907 49249 151619 67117 188376 1610273 1852642 232204 39398 5065819 
2008 841327 124734 48310 169403 84957 222844 1786342 2155102 234716 39023 5706758 
2009 871032 118742 63540 175339 90692 216370 1795641 2376721 255034 41990 6005101 
2010 894523 120683 66962 187193 107207 237927 1903847 2513440 251673 42886 6326342 
2011 912309 107052 65029 174212 112346 234364 1704300 2678005 259257 59147 6306020 
2012 929873 108677 68227 185054 128436 254924 1804300 2846487 261857 59420 6647255 
 
Note: The Emigration destinations considered are EU-15, the USA, Turkey (for Bulgarians), Moldova (for Romanians) and the Czech Republic (for Slovaks). The table 
aggregates estimates presented in Electronic Appendix (EA) Tables 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.   
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Table 3 The Estimated Shares of the CEE Voting Age Populations Residing Abroad 
Bulgaria 
1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 
4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.8 8.0 
Czech 
Republic 
1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.2 
Estonia 
1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
1.9 1.9 2.2 3.1 4.9 6.9 
Hungary 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.1 
Latvia 
1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
0.6 0.7 1.0 1.7 3.6 6.4 
Lithuania 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
0.4 0.7 1.1 1.8 7.4 9.9 
Poland 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 
NA 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 3.0 
Romania 
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 4.4 11.5 
Slovakia 
1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 
0.3 0.3 0.8 1.6 2.3 3.6 
Slovenia 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 
1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Average 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.1 3.5 5.5 
 
Note: This table based on the estimated number of CEE citizens in voting age living in the principal emigration 
destinations (see Table 2), their age distribution described in Section 2, and the size of CEE electorates (EA Table 
19).   
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Table 4 Provisions for External Voting in CEE 
Country 
Introduction of 
External Voting1   
Voting Method2 
Registration 
Deadline for 
External Voting 
Count of External 
Votes2 
Bulgaria 1994 Personal No deadline 
Assimilated in 
the nationwide 
result since 20053 
Czech 
Republic 
2002 Personal 40 days 
Assimilated in a 
constituency 
selected by lot 
Estonia 1992 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal since 1992, 
E-Voting since the 
election of 2007). 
30 days 
(no deadline for 
electronic 
voting) 
Assimilated in 
the constituency 
of former 
residence 
Hungary 2006 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal since 2013) 
8 days 
(personal) 
10 days 
(postal), 
Assimilated in 
the nation-wide 
result since 20104 
Latvia 1992 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal since the 
election of 1998) 
21 days 
Assimilated in 
the Riga 
constituency 
Lithuania 1992 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal) 
15 days 
Assimilated in 
the Vilnius 
constituency 
Poland 1990 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal since 2011) 
3 days 
(personal) 
15 days (postal) 
Assimilated in 
the Central 
Warsaw 
Constituency 
Romania 1992 Personal No deadline 
Counted 
separately in a 
special 
constituency 
since 20085 
Slovakia 2006 Postal 50 days 
Assimilated in 
the nation-wide 
result 
Slovenia 1992 
Mixed (Personal, 
Postal) 
30 days (but, de 
facto, 
automatic) for 
postal voting, 
15 days 
(personal) 
Assimilated in 
the constituency 
of former 
residence6 
Note: Data as of 2014. Sources: EUDO Citizenship Observatory Reports (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-
profiles, accessed 30/05/2015) and questionnaires sent to the national electoral authorities. 1 Each entry 
corresponds to the year of the first democratic legislative election in which external voting was allowed. 2 Unless 
specified otherwise, the legislation has been in place since the introduction of external voting. 3 Until the election 
of 2001, the Bulgarian external votes were assimilated in four regional constituencies (cf. Dobreva 2013, 14). 4 
Until the election of 2010, the Hungarian external votes were assimilated in one of the regional constituencies. 5 
Before the election of 2008, Romanian external votes were assimilated in the Bucharest constituency. 6 If the 
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constituency of former residence (of voters themselves or one of their parents) cannot be determined, voters may 
choose the constituency in which they vote.  
 
Table 5 Quantitative Variables – Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
External Turnout 
(dependent variable)  
27 9.31 7.71 1.10 32.10 
Registration   
(days before election)  
27 15.59 17.67 0 50 
Electorate Abroad   
(as % of total electorate)  
27 5.23 3.39 0.90 13.70 
Domestic Turnout 27 56.63 7.65 41.74 69.70 
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Table 6 OLS Regression Analysis of External Voting Rates 
 
Model 1 
(Registration) 
Model 2 
(Electorate 
Abroad) 
Model 3 
(Full 
Model) 
Model 4 
(PCSE) 
Model 5 
(Fixed 
Effects & 
PCSE) 
Registration  
(days before 
election)  
-0.14 
(0.05)** 
 
 
-0.11 
(0.04)* 
-0.11 
(0.03)** 
 
 
Electorate Abroad  
(as % of total 
electorate)  
 
 
0.90 
(0.28)** 
0.71 
(0.26)* 
0.71 
(0.11)*** 
0.45 
(0.11)*** 
Domestic Turnout 
0.29 
(0.11)* 
0.35 
(0.11)** 
0.36 
(0.10)** 
0.36 
(0.04)*** 
0.33 
(0.06)*** 
Slovenia  
19.06 
(3.03)*** 
21.46 
(3.00)*** 
20.57 
(2.72)*** 
20.57 
(2.19)*** 
14.23 
(2.51)*** 
Romania  
-4.66 
(2.83) 
-5.99 
(2.88)* 
-6.80 
(2.61)* 
-6.80 
(1.42)*** 
-10.04 
(1.51)*** 
Remaining Country 
Dummies 
No No No No Yes 
Constant 
-6.04 
(6.53) 
-16.21 
(7.14)* 
-14.19 
(6.48)* 
-14.19 
(2.06)*** 
-7.05 
(4.76) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.776 0.786 0.835 0.835 0.964 
Note: Standard errors or panel corrected standard errors (PCSE, in Models 4 and 5) are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Model 5, which applies fixed-effects, does not include Registration because it is a time-
invariant variable.  
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Table 7 Formalised Calculation of the Counterfactual Voter Turnout Rates  
Step 1: 
Tei = Rei * Sei 
Rdi = (Ti – Tei) / Sdi 
In the first step, emigrants’ contribution (Tei) is deduced from the nationwide turnout rate 
(Ti) in order to generate a precise estimate of the ‘purely’ domestic voting rate (Rdi). This is 
done as follows: First, the external voting turnout rate (Rei) is multiplied by the emigrant’s 
share in the total electorate (Sei). Second, the resulting product (Tei) is subtracted from the 
nationwide turnout (Ti) and divided by the share of domestic citizens in the total electorate 
(Sdi).    
Step 2: Tdfi = Rdi * Sd1 
In the second step, I calculate the ‘domestic contribution’ to the counterfactual voter turnout 
rate (Tdfi) by multiplying the purely domestic turnout rate (Rdi) from Step 1 and the share of 
domestic citizens in the total electorate from the first democratic election (Sd1).  
Step 3: 
Reai = Rei – b * (Sei – Se1) 
Tefi = Reai * Se1 
Before calculating the ‘external contribution’ to the counterfactual voter turnout rate (Tefi), 
which is the main purpose of Step 3, it should be reminded that the theory in Section 1 and 
the empirical analysis in Table 5 show that external voting rates depend on diaspora size (the 
larger the share of emigrants in the total electorate, the higher external turnout). Therefore, 
as the current calculation of counterfactual voter turnout is based on the diaspora size from 
the first election, which is smaller than the real diaspora size observed in later elections, the 
real external voting rate (Rei) needs to be adjusted. This is done by reducing the real rate (Rei) 
by the product of the effect of diaspora size (b) and the difference between the real share (Sei) 
and the counterfactual share (Se1) of emigrants in the total electorate. To operationalize the 
effect of diaspora size, I rely on the regression coefficient of the variable Electorate Abroad 
from Model 5 in Table 5 (i.e. 0.3). As an aside, this adjustment is a theoretical imperative 
but, in practice, it reduces the calculated counterfactual voter turnout in the CEE-10 (i.e. the 
final outcome after Step 4) by a virtually negligible 0.01 percentage points on average.  
Subsequently, the ‘external contribution’ (Tefi) is obtained by multiplying the product of the 
adjusted external voting rate (Reai) and the share of expatriated citizens in the total electorate 
in the first democratic elections (Se1).  
Step 4: Tcfi = Tdi + Tei 
Finally, the addition of the domestic and external contributions yields the counterfactual voter 
turnout rate (Tcfi) that would be observed in each election if nothing changed except the level 
of emigration that would be kept constant from the first democratic election onwards.  
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Table 8 Effect of Emigration on Voter Turnout in the 6th Democratic Election  
 
Country Election Year 
Official  
Voter Turnout 
Counterfactual 
Voter Turnout 
Effect of 
Emigration on 
Voter Turnout 
 Bulgaria 2005 55.8 57.5 -1.7 
Czech Republic 2006 64.5 65.0 -0.5 
Estonia 2011 63.5 66.2 -2.7 
Hungary 2010 64.4 65.1 -0.7 
Latvia 2010 62.6 65.7 -3.0 
Lithuania 2012 52.9 58.0 -5.0 
Poland 2005 40.6 41.2 -0.6 
Romania 2008 39.2 43.9 -4.7 
Slovakia 2006 54.7 56.5 -1.8 
Slovenia 2011 65.6 65.8 -0.1 
Average 2008.4 56.4 58.5 -2.1 
 
Note: The calculation of the counterfactual voter turnout is described in Table 7. 
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Table 9 Votes from Abroad 1989 – 2012 (Absolute Numbers) 
Election/ 
Country 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Bulgaria 
1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009  
0 0 20304 26856 64822 77020 156195  
Czech 
Republic  
1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010  
0 0 0 0 3763 6744 8222  
Estonia 
1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011   
9349 6647 3294 1915 2751 8253   
Hungary 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010   
0 0 0 0 6679 6761   
Latvia 
1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 2011  
NA  NA 10080 7490 7580 12778 14210   
Lithuania  
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012   
NA  4305 5623 9313 10345 13061   
Poland 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 
NA  40834 41918 44561 26229 35679 149244 199678 
Romania 
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012  
NA  43765 73302 33151 40816 23807 60634  
Slovakia 
1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2012 
0 0 0 0 0 3427 5861 7051 
Slovenia 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011   
NA  NA  NA NA 11262 10778   
 
Note: The value of zero corresponds to those elections in which external voting was not in effect. NA 
stands for ‘data not available’. In Slovenia, there are no official records of external votes for the pre-2008 elections 
although external voting has been in effect since 1992. All the data were obtained from the CEE-10 national 
authorities.  
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Figure 1 Emigrants’ Share in the Total Population of the Sending Countries 1990-2012 
 
Note: Romania and the Czech Republic display respectively the highest and lowest share of 
emigrants among the CEE-10. Source: EA Table 12.  
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Figure 2 Average Nationwide and External Voting Rates 
 
 
Note: Disaggregated rates are presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Nationwide and External Voting Rates by Country 
 
 
Note: The missing observations for external voting turnout correspond to years in which 
external voting was not practiced or to missing data. See EA Table 10 for details.    
 
 
 
 
